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FLATTENED RATES, BROADENED BASE 
by Eric B. Travers 
In his January 25, 1984, State of the Union Address, President Ronald Reagan 
issued the first official public proclamation about the tax reform plan that would evolve 
into the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). In its final form, the Act's revisions and 
sweeping changes to the tax code could rightly be called "historic." TRA86 combined 
individual and corporate tax rate reductions with loophole closing and other base-
broadening measures in an attempt to spur economic growth while avoiding significant 
revenue losses. 
In lowering rates, TRA86 built upon the changes enshrined in the Economic Recov-
ery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA), by lightening the tax burden on all Americans. At the 
same time, since TRA86 was supposed to be revenue-neutral, a number of loopholes 
were eliminated, including investment "incentives" created by ERTA I to offset the 
revenue loss the rate reductions were expected to bring.2 TRA86, then, was actually 
something of a hybrid, combining the policy prescriptions of the more politically conser-
vative supply- side (or "new classical") economists and the politically liberal Keynesians. 3 
In any event, by most statistical yardsticks4, TRA86 was a success. 
After the passage of TRA86 and until the infamous 1990 Omnibus Budget Reconcili-
ation Act,5 the economy experie~ced the longest peacetime expansion in U.S. history. 
From 1986 to 1989, unemployment declined6 while real median family income7 and real 
average household incomes rose. As economic growth spurred revenues upward,9 the 
deficit tumbled, l 0 inflation remained lowl 1, and real per capita disposable income and 
living standards went up.12 While interest rates did rise slightly, they remained almost 
ten points below their pre-ERTA leveI.13 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) soared, 14 
and America prospered. The 1990 and 1993 tax increases were distinct breaks from 
1986 and were followed by a recession and one of the weakest recoveries on record. The 
history of TRA86, the economic rationale behind its various provisions, and the eco-
nomic consequences are important in today's economy, precisely because the success of 
the Act can provide a beacon to light the way for future tax reform. 
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History of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 
The end of World War II marked the rise of the economic theories of John Maynard 
Keynes. Over the next several decades, Keynesian economics, as it was called, became 
the dominant and conventional wisdom of government economists. By the time Presi-
dent Nixon ~eclared in 1971 that "We are all Keynesians now,;" cracks had begun to 
form in the theory. The Keynesian Universe was poised to enter a decade that would 
ravage some of the central tenants of the theory (primarily the Phillips Curve and the 
IS-LM model 15) and lead to a revival of classical economics under the guise of "supply-
side" theory. 
As the 1970's began, a recent tax increase had pushed the U.S. tax burden to a post-
war high. The tax-burden, however, was destined to become even more onerous as 
inflation-induced "bracket-creep" pushed citizens into higher tax brackets. Even 
though in real terms many Americans were barely keeping up with inflation, they were 
having to pay taxes at higher individual rates because the .tax code did not take into 
account the slipping purchasing power of the dollar.16 When combined with the Arab 
oil embargo of 1973 (which helped push the inflation rate to 12.5%17), the negative 
effects of high rates were becoming obvious. As the poverty rate climbed, economic 
growth stagnated and interest rates rose sharply.IS The economy was hit with several 
recessions. Inflation and unemployment were rising-an impossibility according to the 
Keynesian Phillips Curve-and a new term was born: "stagflation." 
As the Keynesians vainly grasped for answers to problems which weren't supposed 
to occur, an alternate current of thought was gaining popularity throughout the eco-
nomic community. The "supply-side" economists, as they were called, Claimed to have 
an answer to stagflation, and the answer lay in the tax code. The time had come, they 
said, for tax cuts. The tax burden had reached a prohibitive level, and individual behav-
ior and money were being funneled into economically unproductive endeavors as a 
result. A way to reverse this would be large across-the-board cuts in individual mar-
ginal tax rates. The ranks of the supply-siders were buffered and supported by such 
notable economists as Robert Mundell, Arthur Laffer, Paul Craig Roberts, and Robert 
Bartley.19 
Supply-side ideas were also taking hold in the political arena. In 1978, Congress-
man Jack Kemp (R-NY) and Senator William Roth (R-DE) proposed a bill (the 
Kemp-Roth tax cut20) to reduce the top marginal tax rate by 30% over three years. 
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The bill was defeated, with the threat of a Jimmy Carter veto hanging over its head, but 
it would come back. A version of the Kemp-Roth bill comprised a major portion of 
ERTA21, and TRA86 contained~ similar rate reduction. Thus, while a Reagan defeat in 
either 1980 or 1984 would surely have meant no tax reform with the breadth and scope 
of the 1986 Act, Reagan's tax policy was actual]y a logical extension and acceleration of a 
form of general economic thought that had been gaining popularity since the middle to 
late 1970's.22 
The philosophy behind the rate reduction was this. Tax rates and changes in tax 
rates affect economic activity by directly influencing people's incentives to work, earn 
money, produce goods and services, save, and invest.23 In order to spur growth, the tax 
cut had to be geared toward increasing incentives, and this meant the cuts had to affect 
marginal rates-the rate a taxpayer would pay on his or her ne~"t:t dollar of income.24 
The backbone of the '86 tax cut, then, was the belief that the "substitution effect" 
was, for the macroeconomy, stronger than the "income effect." The new-classical 
economists behind the supply-side movement felt that individuals faced with the option 
of keeping more of each additional dollar earned (through, for example, a tax cut) would 
generally be more inclined to work longer and produce more. The value of work would 
be greater than the value of leisure. Likewise, at prohibitively high tax rates, people 
would be inclined to work less; Money that would otherwise be invested in new compa-
nies and capital stock was instead languishing in tax shelters, forced thereby the relative 
unprofitability taxes imposed on the extra "return" of each invested dollar. Taxes, then, 
were self-defeating and suppressing growth. The answer was lower rates. 
Despite its shiny new garb, this theory was not really new. Emphasis on the disin-
centives of prohibitively high tax rates had roots all the way back to Adam Smith.25 
Even Keynes agreed with the general proposition of the "supply- siders." In a slender 
1933 tome entitled The Means to Prosperity, Keynes wrote: 
Nor should the argument seem strange that taxation may be so high as to defeat 
its object, and that, given sufficient time ... a reduction of taxation will run a 
better chance, than an increase, of balancing the budget. For to take the oppo-
site view ... is to resemble the manufacturer who, running at a loss, decides to 
raise his price, and when his declining sales increase the loss, wrapping himself 
in the rectitude of plain arithmetic, decides that prudence requires him to raise 
the price still more;-and who, when at last his account is balanced with nought 
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on both sides, is still found righteously declaring that it would have been the act 
of a gambler to reduce the price when you were already making a loss.26 
While·ERT A went a long way toward reducing the individual tax burden-indexing 
the individual rate brackets, lowering tax rates 25% across the board27 and the top rate 
from 70% to 50%28_ and.though the result was higher income taxpayers paying more, 
many corporations still used tax breaks and credits to avoid paying any taxes at all. This 
tidbit of information received publicity in 1984 with the publication of a study showing 
that 128 "large and profitable" corporations had paid no federal income tax from 1981 to 
1983.29 In his book For the Record, former Treasury Secretary and Chief of Staff 
Donald Regan noted that the tax system remained "complicated, inequitable, expensive 
to administer, and so filled with loopholes that it was entirely unnecessary to cheat on 
taxes in order to avoid paying them. . . . The inequity was [most] glaring in the case of 
corporations. Our job was to make the tax system fairer and simp~er and more economi-
cally efficient. "30 
The revenue gains from closing such "glaring" loopholes would be used to cover the 
revenue losses expected from the President's desire to further lighten the load on indi-
vidual taxpayers. The concept of a revenue-neutral tax code revision was born. Using 
static analysis (ie., assuming behavior is unaffected by tax rates)31 to come up with the 
numbers, savings from eliminating tax breaks would be funneled back to reduce the 
overall tax rates on individuals and corporations.32 The major players in the actual 
writing of the bill were Senate Finance Committee Chairman Bob Packwood (R-OR), 
House Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski (D-IL), and Treasury Secretary 
Donald Regan. 33 
' After a good deal of false starts, mis-steps and revisions, a bill was finally pounded 
out and produced for a vote in the House on September 25, 1986. With wide bi- parti-
san support, it passed by a count of 292-136.34 Two days later, the Senate approved the 
measure 74-23.35 On October 22, a triumphant President Reagan signed the measure on 
the White 'House south lawn and spoke of a WMhington P0<1t headline about the bill 
which said, simply, "The Impossible Became the lnevitable."36 
The 1986 Tax Reform Act was finally complete. Its major provisions .could be 
broken down into two groups: (1) base-broadening structural changes and (2) rate 
reductions and growth incentives. 
The base-broadening measures reached into a number of areas. Many incentives for 
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tax shelter investments were either reduced or eliminated. Numerous special business 
deductions were repealed, as was the investment tax credit. Depreciation deductions 
were revised to lower the amount one could deduct each year as a depreciation loss on 
capital stock. The 60% exclusion of long-term capital gains from taxation was repealed 
(making 100% of capital gains taxable), and the capital gains tax was increased from 
20% to 28%. Furthermore, people could no longer deduct state and local taxes from 
their federal income tax. 
The following revisions would appear in the second group. Personal tax exemptions 
were increased from $1,080 to $2,000. The standard deduction was raised from $2,480 a 
person and $3,670 for couples, to $3,000 and $5,000 respectively. The earned income 
tax credit was increased to allow exemption of 14% of earnings up to $5,714. For 
families with incomes over $9,000 (1986 dollars), the credit was to be phased out by 
1988. The tax code was simplified by reducing the sixteen bracket individual-income 
tax rate structure, which ran from 11 % to 50%, to two brackets-15% and 28%. The 
maximum corporate tax rate was dropped from 46% on profits over $100,000 to 34% on 
profits over $75,000, and some 4 million low-income earners were removed from the tax 
rolls entirely. 37 
The new-classical economists in the Reagan administration favored the large tax rate 
reductions as a means of increasing the incentives to work, save and invest, while de-
creasing the profitability of hiding behind tax shelters. 38 ' As the incentives grew, eco-
nomic growth would be spurred, and the tax base would broaden naturally. As aggre-
gate supply increased, the Reagan program assumed the Federal Reserve Bank, under 
Paul Volcker, would continue to restrict growth in the money supply (thereby reducing 
aggregate demand) . Combined, the two effects would lead to increased economic wealth 
while keeping inflation low. 
Keynesian concerns, that the tax cuts would be inflationary, were misplaced not only 
because the aggregate supply curve would shift out (offsetting the increased consump-
tion) but because of the deflationary impact of the loophole closing, particularly on the 
asset market. 39 Short term inflationary pressures on the aggregate economy would be 
swamped by the sell-off of assets that had lost their protected tax status. 
Since many of the tax shelters required investors to actually own a tangible asset, the 
reason for holding the asset would disappear as its tax exemption shrank. Indeed, one of 
the anecdotes repeatedly heard during congressional debate was that of the so-called 
see-through office buildings-" commonplace in cities like Houston"-built not because 
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of the demand for office space but as tax-sheltered investm~nts.40 Lower tax rates and 
fewer shelters would trigger a sell-off of investor's hard assets toward money- market 
investments, stocks and bonds, and other producers of taxable income.41 The result, 
then, would not be inflation but deflation, particularly in the real estate market, as 
investors rushed to move out of tangible assets. Operating on the rather safe assumption 
that the Federal Reserve Bank would continue its "tight-money" policy, aggregate prices 
would remain relatively stable and inflation under control. Indeed, inflation expecta-
tions, as measured by interest rates42 and exchange rates43, declined following the 
announcement of the tax act. 
The Keynesians applauded the legislative loophole closing and the increase in the 
capital-gains tax as ways of increasing the taxes on the wealthy and corporate 
America.44 Indeed, these base broadeners were probably the most enduring aspect of 
TRA86. Official estimates placed the loss of revenue from rate cuts at $121.7 billion 
over five years. During that same time period, the rise on corporations was estimated to 
garner $120.4 billion45. In reality, the base broadeners raised some $227 billion. The 
increase in the capital-gains tax ultimately lost money, though, because the windfall 
expected from the static analysis of the numbers never materialized and revenues actu-
ally dropped by more than 50% from 1986 to 1987.46 
In any event, as the tax liabilities of lower income quintiles fell, and the rich became 
more willing to expose their money to the lower tax rates, the share of income taxes paid 
by the rich substantially increased. When Reagan took office in 1981, the top 5% of 
earners accounted for 35% of federal tax revenue. By the time of TRA86, the share of 
the top 5% had risen to 42%. After TRA86, this share continued to rise until 1990, when 
the top 5% of wage earners accounted for 49% of federal income tax revenues.47 Notice 
that the upward trend started after ERTA's enactment, which did not close loopholes. 
Thus, it appears lower marginal rates probably had at least as much to do with the rising 
share of taxes paid by the rich, after TRA86, as did the loophole closing. 
The claim that the rich paid more only because they had a larger share of income is 
incorrect for several reasons. The lower rates, after all, do not merely affect the number 
of hours that high-income taxpayers work. Lower rates play a role in financial decisions 
about where to put one's money, how much income to shelter, and how much to declare 
as taxable income. As tax rates come down, investors are likely to hold more taxable 
securities and fewer tax exempt securities.48 Florida State University economics profes-
sor James Gwartney notes: 
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The lower rates drew funds out of the tax shelters and reduced the attractiveness 
of pleasurable, tax- deductible, business-related expenses .... Reported income 
after deductions-from partnerships and Sub-S Corporations of the top 5 per 
cent of taxpayers-rose from $12 billion in 1980 to $56 billion in 1988, a whop-
ping 360% increase. Similarly, the reported income from business and profes-
sional practice of the top earners skyrocketed during the 1980's.49 
The removal of the incentive to hide income, then, by lowering the tax rates, had the 
desired effect of pulling money out of unproductive tax shelters and into taxable growth-
orientated investments. 50 The rich paid more, largely because they were reporting more. 
This benefited the entire economy because money-pursuing investment, not shelters, is 
money that encourages growth, increases output, and increases aggregate supply. 
In any event, from 1984 to 1989, a period roughly coinciding with TRA86, the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics found that real, per-capita, before-tax income rose substan-
tially for every quintile of income di,stribution. The lowest and second lowest quintiles 
saw real rises in income of 68% and 18.7% respectively. The highest quintile had gains of 
19.2%.51 The lower quintiles, then, when measured against past performance, were not 
being outperformed by the rich in terms of real gains. 
Now, if measured as a percentage of the increase of total income gains across the 
economy, the top 20% earned 42.8% of total income gai~s.52 Though 42.8% may seem 
high for 20% of the population, this somewhat misleading figure is easily explained. 
Total income gains are bound to be larger for the highest group studied because the 
fastest gainers from lower groups will rise to a higher quintile. Their income gains, then, 
cannot push the average of their original group's quintile up. Since there is no higher 
group for the fastest income gainers in the top percentage to climb to, all income gains 
for the top group will be counted in the top group's income. 53 Since figures exclude 
taxes-Census Bureau figures show average income taxes for the top group equalling 
$24,322 in 199054_and do not adjust capital gains for inflation, they tend to overstate 
the income of the upper-level earners. Moreover, since the quintiles are based on 
percentages, as incomes rise, the cut-off necessary to qualify for the top group will rise. 
Thus, the average income and income gains of the upper quintile rise. In any event, the 
42.8% figure is actually the lowest of any post-war period; during the 1976-80 period, 
for instance, 100% of the income gains went to the top 20% of earners. 55 
Employment boomed following the enactment of TRA86. The unemployment rate 
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fell from 7.0% in 1986 to 5.3% in 1989.56 This represented some 10.1 million new jobs, 
even as the labor force participation rate reached a record level of 66.5%.57 These were 
good jobs, too. Data from the Bureau of Labor statistics (in constant 1984 dollars) 
shows that in Reagan's second term, 46.1 % of the jobs created paid more than $28,048. 
Only 6% paid under $7,012.58 82% of the jobs during the Reagan era were in the higher 
paying, higher skilled occupations (defined as technical, precision production, and 
managerial and professional). 59 Black labor force participation also hit record levels by 
1989 (64.2%), while the female labor force participation reached an all- time record of 
57.5% one year later.60 The numbers for women affirmed that one of the goals of the 
1986 Act-reducing marginal tax burdens on secondary family earners-had the desired 
effect of bringing more women into the marketplace.61 
Combined with the tax cuts, this increased employment helped to raise real median 
family income by 11.3% between 1983 and 1989. This turnabout reversed a decline that 
began in the late 1970's, when family incomes declined by 10% in real terms from 1978 
to 1982.62 The real average income of U.S. households rose almost 12% from 1986 to 
1989, after declining nearly 1 % from 1970 to 1980.63 
The inevitable winners in this economic expansion were the American people. The 
standard of living increased by nearly a fifth as real disposable income per capita climbed 
18%.64 The poverty rate, which had started to increase rapidly in the years before 
Reagan came to office, rising by one third from 1978 to 1983, was stopped and then 
reduced. After TRA86, poverty fell almost 7% between 1986 and 1989.65 Interest rates, 
using the prime rate as a guide, declined slightly the first year after TRA86-from 8.33% 
to 8.21 %-before rising to 10.01 % in 1990 and then dropping to 6.25% in 1992.66 
Inflation fears about the tax cuts proved unfounded as inflation remained in check. It 
hovered between 1.9% and 4.8% between 1986 and 1989.67 The prime rate never 
approached the 18.87% it was when Reagan took office in 1981. Low interest rates in 
the years after TRA86 helped to devalue the U.S. dollar. As a result, from 1986 to 1989, 
the trade deficit fell from $138.7 billion to $89.9 billion.68 
The federal deficit, too, fell every year in real terms after TRA86' s passage. A deficit 
that was $227 billion69 in 1986 was reduced by $86 billion in 1989, to $141 billion. As a 
percentage of gross domestic product, the total federal deficit declined from 5.2% to 
2.9%.70 Total individual income tax revenues, even at the dramatically lower marginal 
rates, increased 15.2% in real terms, from $349 billion dollars in 1986 to $402 billion in 
1989 (FY86 dollars). Total federal revenues meanwhile increased in real terms 16% 
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during that same time. In FY87 dollars, $790 billion was collected in 1986 and $916.2 in 
1989.71 Total federal revenue during this time even outpaced the rapidly growing GDP, 
increasing from 18.2% to 19.2% of GDP, thereby returning pretty close to the postwar 
average of 19.5%.72 GDP, after being adjusted for inflation, increased 13%, from $4.3 
trillion in 1986 (FY87 dollars) to $4 .86 trillion in 1989. 73 
The economic legacy of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, then, was economic growth that 
propelled the United States into a period of unprecedented economic growth. The Act 
was a historic break from previous legislation in that, in large part, it abandoned the use 
of the tax code for "income redistribution and aggregate demand management of the 
economy."74 In lowering rates and eliminating the need for numerous and unproductive 
tax shelters, a policy climate was created which would maximize individual incentives to 
pursue economic well-being with minimal government interference. 
The results were immediate, overwhelming, and beneficial to the country as a whole. 
Virtually every major economic indicator-from inflation to unemployment, to interest 
rates, to real family income, to per capita income, the poverty rate, the living standard, 
and gross domestic product-improved while the Act was in effect. Its virtual repeal by 
the 1990 tax increase coincided with the end of a ninety-two month recovery, halting the 
economic growth and reversing many of the positive trends of the preceding years. 
In 1986, President Reagan remarked on his vision for the economic future of the 
country and what the tax cuts could spur: "In formulating our program for healthy and 
continued economic expansion, we recognized the limited role that government properly 
plays. The Federal Government cannot provide prosperity or generate economic 
growth; it can only encourage private initiative, innovation, and entrepreneurial activity 
that produce economic opportunities."75 
Reagan was right. The legacy of TRA86 and the economic boom it fueled provide 
lessons in the direction that future tax reforms should be directed. The tax reform 
succeeded not because it punished the rich by imposing high marginal rates but because 
it created an economic environment conducive to growth. The living standards of all 
Americans were lifted on the rising tide of American economic might.76 The true route 
to fairness in the tax code, then, seems to lie in flattening marginal rates and treating 
Americans more fairly, not less. When the number of tax brackets was dropped from 
sixteen to two, the result was that all income groups received real income gains. The 
upper quintile of earners even paid proportionately more in federal revenue after TRA86 
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